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Abstract
En primet lexical decision task ble gjennomført for å teste ulike teorier om merkenavn. Noen 
lingvister og filosofer argumenterer, at de er en underklasse av egennavn, og at de er direkte 
refererende, mens andre foreslår at merkenavn og egennavn, akkurat som vanlige substantiv, 
refererer indirekte gjennom sitt semantisk innhold. Basert på disse divergerende teorier ble det 
formulert  to  alternativhypoteser  AH1:  "Primingeffekter  er  forskjellige  for  merkenavn  og 
vanlige substantiv' og AH2: 'Reaksjonstidmønstre er forskjellige for merkenavn og vanlige 
substantiv'.
En reaksjonstid-målende umaskert primet lexical decision task med en uprimet versjon som 
baseline ble gjennomført,  med merkenavn,  vanlige substantiver  og non-words som target-
stimuli. Fem grupper av stimuli-par ble brukt: relaterte merker og relaterte ord ble primet med 
vanlige substantiver som var relatert til målet i form av hyperonymi, prime-stimulusen for 
urelaterte  merker,  urelaterte  ord  og  non-words  var  urelaterte  vanlige  substantiv.  SOA var 
200ms.
Analysen  av  resultatene  fra  begge  eksperiment-versjoner  viste  ingen  signifikante 
primingeffekter for verken merkenavn eller vanlige substantiv. Dette kan være forårsaket av å 
bruke ren semantisk priming som en fremgangsmåte, som er kjent for å produsere svakere 
primingeffekter  (se  Lucas  2000,  Perea  &  Rosa  2002),  i  stedet  for  assosierende  priming. 
Signifikante hemmende priming effekter ble funnet for urelaterte merkenavn (p <0,01) og 
urelaterte ord (p <0,001), noe som kan forklares med expectancy-effekten. Imidlertid ble det 
ikke funnet noen signifikant forskjell for disse effektene på merkenavn og vanlige substantiv. 
Dermed har NH1 blitt avvist.
Det ble heller ikke funnet noe forskjell  i  reaksjonstid ved analysen av resultatene fra den 
unprimete  versjonen  av  forsøket,  med  unntak  av  ord  fra  den  relaterte  ord-  og  relaterte 
merkevarer-klassen, der de relaterte merker hadde signifikant kortere reaksjonstid (p <0,01). 
Disse funnene kan være basert på metodiske problemer, for eksempel ulike frekvenser for 
target-stimulusen. For ord i den urelaterte ord- og urelaterte merkevare-klassen ble det ikke 
funnet noen signifikant forskjell i reaksjonstidene, det samme gjelder for en helhetlig analysen 
som sammenlignet alle merkenavn og vanlige substantiv fra baselinen. AH2 ble derfor avvist.
Det  ble  konkludert  med  at  de  hemmende  priming-effekter  indikerer,  at  behandling  av 
merkenavn krever aktivering av det semantiske nettverket. Dette impliserer at strenge direkte 
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In this study, I investigated priming effects on brand name recognition which I compared to 
priming effects on common nouns. This was done by conducting an unmasked primed lexical 
decision task with reaction time measuring. Also, reaction times were compared for brand 
names and common nouns. A lot of research has been done on priming effects on nouns, but 
hardly  any  on  brand  names.  This  seems  surprising,  as  brand  names  have  some  rather 
interesting properties, and their classification is quite disputable. Obviously, they are different 
from personal or geographical names. While a sentence like I saw a Pepsi in the fridge sounds 
perfectly fine, a sentence like ?I saw a Peter in the subway sounds odd. But they still share 
some properties with these kinds of names, that makes them different from common nouns: 
the search engine Google works, ?the book collection library – not so much. Then again, is 
there a homogenous group that fits the label brand names? Or are there indeed some brand 
names that act like common nouns, while others act like proper names?
In the first chapter of this work, I will examine the semantic and lexical nature of common 
nouns and proper names and compare two main theories on the nature of proper names, the 
direct reference theory and the indirect or intermediate reference theory. Based on that, I will 
attempt to explain, why some brand names are so hard to put a label on, and what the different 
theories would predict for the outcome of the experiment.
Chapter 2 describes the methods used in this experiment, namely reaction time measuring and 
semantic  priming  and  the  motivation  to  use  these  methods  as  well  as  the  theoretic 
assumptions  that  the experiment  is  based on. Furthermore,  the stimulus  and the technical 
setup will be presented.
The third chapter will deal with the statistical analysis of the results, based on the two null-
hypotheses ‘Priming effect is the same for brand names and common nouns’ and ‘Reaction 
time  patterns  are  the  same  for  brand  names  and  common  nouns’  and  the  alternative 
hypotheses ‘Priming effect is different for brand names and common nouns’ and ‘Reaction 
time patterns  are  different  for  brand names  and common nouns’.  It  further  describes  the 
statistical methods used to analyze the data gained in the experiment and presents the results.
Chapter 4 gives an interpretation of the results in relation to the characterization of brand 
names and nouns in semantics as described in the first chapter.
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The fifth and last chapter gives a summary of the article and addresses questions that still  
need to be answered as well as new questions that were raised during the work on this thesis. 
Further,  it  points out possible sources of error during the study and gives suggestions for 
future research.
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1 – Semantic background
The difference between common nouns and names has aroused the curiosity of philosophers 
and linguists for a long time. One of the most obvious differences is the fact, that proper 
names are inherently definite, that means that they usually1 don’t need definite articles, as 
their semantic function involves a presupposition of uniqueness and existence and they have a 
fixed referent, all of which has to be established by use of determiners for common nouns 
(Van Langendonck 2007:154).
When Gottlob Frege (1892) discussed the distinction between sense (“Sinn”) and reference or 
denotation (“Bedeutung”) of a word, he mentions proper names, stating that they do have 
meaning, even though the content of the meaning might depend on the speaker’s knowledge 
of  or  attitude  towards  the  person  referred  to2.  Although  Frege  generally  calls  all  nouns 
“Eigennamen”, ‘proper names’ and attempts to treat proper names and common nouns similar, 
he does acknowledge that ‘actual’ proper names and common nouns differ in the latter having 
an objective meaning, while the meaning of proper names tends to be somewhat subjective, 
reflecting the individual’s attitude towards the person or entity referred to by the name. The 
reference is then established through the sense of the name. Later philosophers, like Kripke 
(1980) argued, that proper names don’t are referential through sense, further claiming that 
they  don’t  attribute  to  the  propositional  content  apart  from determining  the  referent,  but 
instead are directly referential.
Both  positions  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  phonological  or  orthpgraphical 
representation of a word, or broader spoken a  sign, activates a mental concept, also called 
meaning, sense,  connotation or  intension,  which  then  refers  to  an  object,  called  referent, 
denotation or extension,  with the relation between the sign and the object being arbitrary 
(Cunningham 2006). The use of these terms often varies and they are often used in conflicting 
ways. In this study, I will use the term meaning to broadly describe “whatever comes to mind, 
when someone says the word” (Traxler 2012:83), while sense refers a bit more specifically to 
the conceptual properties assigned to a word, “represented by a set of nodes and links between 
1 geographic names are special here, since mountains and rivers usually require the definite article
2 One should keep in mind that Freges definition of meaning differs a lot from nowadays definition of lexical  
meaning (Van Langendonck 2007).
-10-
them” (ibid.). The word referent then describes the object denoted by the word, with reference 




Figure 1: Relation between sign, sense and referent
Today, in addition to the lexical meaning, other properties are being used to distinguish proper 
names from common nouns, such as grammatical features or pragmatic properties.
In the following sub-chapters, I will present some definitions for common nouns and proper 
names, based on semantics and logic.
1.1 – Common Nouns
Oxford dictionary defines a noun as
“[a] word (other than a pronoun) used to identify any of a class of people, places, or 
things (common noun), or to name a particular one of these (proper noun)”.
(Oxford Dictionary Online 2016a)
Both common nouns and names are thus considered nouns. Indeed, especially in language 
philosophy, both are often referred to as names (Frege 1892, Kripke 1980). Without denying 
that categorization, I use the terms common noun and proper name in this paper, to make the 
distinction more clear. This counts also for indirect citations from other works, where I will 
adapt the terminology to the one I use in this work.
According  to  Cann  et  al.  (2009:49),  common  nouns,  just  like  verbs  and  adjectives,  are 
classified as predicates in predicate logic. Nouns are single-place-predicates, that means they 
take one argument and combine with it to form a propositional formula. Thus a sentence like
1) Tom is a man.
would be translated into predicate logic formula as  Man(Tom), or  M(a). Note that the name 
Tom is treated as an individual constant.
In type logic, the fact that common nouns act as predicates is reflected in them being of the 
type e → t, where e referes to an entity and t refers to a truth-value (cf. Cann et al. 2009: 85) 
So what a noun in type logic basically does, is to take an entity and produce a truth value. If 
there is an entity, then a truth value of the type 1/true or 0/false will be produced, 1 if the  
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entity complies to the sense of the noun and 0 if it doesn’t. For the sentence in 1), with Tom 
being of the type e, and man being of the type e → t, that can be illustrated like this:
Tom is a man : t
Tom : e man : e → t
Thus, a common noun is not directly referential, it is only referential by its sense. When using 
a common noun, one refers to a set of concepts, its sense, which defines a class of entities.
In other words, the signifier (in oral speech that would be the phonological representation) of 
a  common  noun  activates  the  nodes  of  corresponding  concepts  in  the  recipient’s  brain, 
representing the sense, who then matches the received information of meaning to the context, 
trying to find an entity that is a part of the defined class.
Because  of  the  intermediate  reference  through  sense,  it  is  possibly  to  convey additional 
meaning that goes beyond the sheer denotation of the referent. While every of the following 
words might be used to refer to the same woman in the same situation, the use of each specific 
common noun alternates the propositional content of the utterance, while at the same time 
revealing information about the mindset of the speaker and his attitude towards the referent: 
female vs. woman vs. bimbo vs. bitch and so on.
1.2 – Proper Names
As seen in the dictionary entry for noun (Oxford Dictionary Online 2016a), proper names are 
thought of referring to one particular entity, unlike common nouns, who refer to classes of 
entities.  Beyond  the  referential  difference,  there  are  some  grammatical  features,  that 
distinguish proper names from common nouns. Van Langendonck (2007:182) lists some of 
them:
They can systematically appear in close appositional structures, such as Hurricane Edna, the 
poet Burns,  Fido the dog and so on. They “do not take restrictive modifiers or quantifiers, 
cannot function as predicate nominals and are the weakest anaphoric elements”. They are 
“inherently definite”, and most proper nouns are “singular, countable, nonrecursive and show 
third person on the lexical level” (Van Langendonck 2007:182).
While there is little dispute about the fact that common nouns have sense, both linguists and 
philosophers heavily disagree on the nature of proper names. Roughly said, there are basically 
two opposite views on the question of whether names have meaning or not. The first view, the 
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mediated or indirect reference theory, whose roots are dating back to Frege (1892), states, that 
proper names have sense which contributes to the propositional content of a sentence and that 
the mechanism of reference is the same as for common nouns,  intermediated through the 
sense (cf. Sullivan 2006).  The degree of sense indirect reference theorist assume in a proper 
name differs. Frege and Russell (1905) state that a proper name can be substituted with a 
definite description, such as “the first African-american man in history who became president 
of the United States” for Barack Obama. The sense of the name would thus be the same as the 
meaning of the definite descriptions referring to the same referent. Others argue that the sense 
of a proper name is more limited, containing “only the nominal property of being the name of 
its  bearer(s)”  (Katz  2001:139).   In  1.2.1  I  will  present  different  variants  of  the  indirect 
reference theory.
The other theory, the direct reference theory, going back to John Stuart Mill (1843), states the 
opposite: A proper name refers directly to the referent, much like indexical expressions such 
as  I or  yesterday (cf. Sullivan 2006). For proper names, this reference can for example be 
based on convention, or a chain of reference, where one speaker used a proper name to refer 
to  an  entity,  and others  followed this  usage.  Even though some proponents  of  the  direct 
reference theory don’t generally reject the idea of proper names having meaning, the meaning 
is not considered determing the referenc (Van Langendonck, 2007)  and does not affect the 
propositional content (Sullivan 2006).
In type logic, proper names have the type e, which reflects the predicate logic’s classification 
of proper names as individual constants. They don’t have predicate status and don’t contribute 
any meaning to the proposition apart from denoting the referent (Cann et al. 2009).
1.2.1 Indirect Reference Theory
As we have seen earlier, Frege (1892) generally referred to nouns, thus both common nouns 
and proper names as  “Eigennamen”,  literally ‘proper names’.  He did so,  because he was 
convinced that proper names (in the modern sense) refer the same way common nouns do, by 
sense. That entails, that the propositional content of an utterance can be varied by using a 
different proper name to refer to the same referent. That would not be possible, if the only 
contribution of the proper name was the referent. One of the more famous examples for this 
argumentation  comes  again  from  Frege  (1892:32,  own  translation),  who  said  that  the 
sentences  “Hesperus  is  a  [celestial]  body,  illuminated  by  the  sun”  and  “Phosphorus  is  a 
[celestial]  body,  illuminated  by  the  sun”,  even  though  both  having  the  planet  Venus  as 
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referent, have a different meaning, and a person could easily think that one of the sentences is 
true, while assuming the other one is wrong, for example thinking of Hesperus as a star, while 
falsely believing that Phosphorus is a planet. At the same time, a sentence like “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” provides new information,  while a sentence like “Venus is Venus” would be 
semantically tautological. 
In  response  to  criticism  from  the  direct  reference  theory,  which  showed  that  definite 
descriptions are insufficient when it  comes to referring to the bearers of proper names in 
possible-world-scenarios  (see  1.2.2),  newer  accounts  on  indirect  reference  use  different 
definition of sense, such as Katz (2001:139), who says that the sense of a proper name N is 
“the thing which is a bearer of ‘N’”. A similar view was proposed by Searle (1958:173), who 
said that proper names can have sense “in a way”, if sense is understood as being “logically 
connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer”.
Chalmers (2004) on the other hand replaced the Fregean definition of sense with the concept 
of intension, which was defined by Carnap based on Fregean sense as followed:
“That a predicate 'Q' in a language L has the property F as its intension for [Speaker] 
X, means that among the dispositions of X constituting the language L there is the 
disposition of ascribing the predicate 'Q'  to any object Y if and only if Y has the 
property F.”
Carnap (1955:35).
This definition is a lot more specific than Frege’s definition of sense and was later expanded 
to the definiton “an intension is a function from possibilities to extensions” (cf. Chalmers 
2004:156) which enables Chalmers to argument for intermediate reference by means of two-
dimensional  semantics,  rebuffing  possible-worlds-argument  used  by  proponents  of  direct 
reference theory. According to him, in two-dimensional semantics, every expression has two 
intensions, called 1-intension for a first-dimensional intension and 2-intension for a second-
dimensional intension. The possibilities evaluated in the first dimension are the ones that a 
speaker  in  his  world  would  see  as  possible  based  on  the  nature  of  his  world  and  his 
perspective, while the second-dimensional possibilities are meant to be possible worlds, that 
is worlds, that can differ in any distinctive way from the speaker’s world. The 1-intension is 
the sense of the expression in the speakers world and perspective, whereas the 2-intension is 
the referent of the 1-intension in the speakers world and extension (cf. Chalmers 2004:160)
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When applied to the Venus-example, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, the 1-intension of these two 
could be described as ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’. If the same statement was 
uttered in other worlds, one of them could be a satellite and one of them could be Mars, in 
which case the statement was wrong. But in the actual world, both refer to Venus, which 
makes the statement correct. The 2-intension of this statement is thus ‘Venus’. If ‘Venus’ is 
‘Venus’ in every possible world, then the statement would be true in all possible worlds. As 
‘Venus’ only property consists of being ‘Venus’, this statement thus is true in all possible 
worlds (cf. Chalmers 2004:160-161).
As  we have  seen,  the  indirect  reference  theory states,  that  proper  names  have  at  least  a 
rudimentary  semantic  content,  thus  semantic  concepts  which  are  a  part  of  the  semantic 
network, and would thus be subject to spread activation processes. If the indirect reference 
theory is true and if brand names behave like proper names, then brand names should show 
semantic priming effects, the same way as common nouns do. A lack of these effects for brand 
names but not for common nouns would be hard to explain by means of indirect reference 
theory, but of course that doesn’t necessarily mean, that semantic priming effects on brand 
names would prove this theory right. As we will see in 1.2.3, brand names might not even 
necessarily be proper names. Instead, a part of them might be common nouns.
1.2.2 Direct Reference Theory
The direct reference theory is closely associated with John Stuart Mill. In his book “A system 
of logic (1843: 22) he wrote: “A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in 
our minds with the idea of the object”, further stating, that proper names denote the referent  
directly, without intermediate sense. Katz (2001) summarizes his view on direct reference as 
follows: 
“Proper names are not connotative.  They denote the individuals who are called by 
them;  but  they  do  not  indicate  or  imply  any  attributes  as  belonging  to  those 
individuals”
(Katz 2001:137)
Later, this view was challenged by Frege and Russel, who argued that different proper names 
referring to the same entity could best be explained with the names having sense.  In 1972, 
Saul Kripke revisited Mills theory, stating that proper names are rigid designators (Kripke 
1972:9). On of his main arguments against indirect reference of proper names is based on 
possible-world scenarios. As Frege (1892) claimed, a proper name could be substituted by a 
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definite description based on the sense of the name. For example, Barack Obama could be 
described as ‘the first  African-american president in  the history of the United States’ and 
‘successor to George W. Bush’. If one now would think of a world, where Barack Obama had 
lost the election in 2008, neither of these statements were true. At the same time, one could 
think of a world where historians found out, that one of the former presidents had indeed 
African-american roots, and so on. That way, for every definite description referring to Barack 
Obama in our actual world, one could find a possible world where none of them refers to 
Barack Obama. Still, as Kripke (1972) claims, the proper name ‘Barack Obama’ would refer 
to Barack Obama, whether he’s president or not.
To avoid such problems inherent to definite descriptions, Kripke (1972) suggests a model he 
calls the chain of communication or causal chain, to explain how reference is established for 
proper names:
“An initial baptism takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the 
reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed form 
link to link’, the receiver of the name must […] intend when he learns it to use it with 
the same reference as the man from whom he learned it.”
(Kripke 1972:96)
The last part is important, since it states that one can use a name for a different reference, if 
one intends to do so. The causal chain would then be interrupted and a new chain would 
begin. Likewise, to different chains of communication could refer to the same entity, as with 
Hesperus and Phosphorus, both referring to Venus via different chains.
One of the fundamentals of direct reference theory is the concept of rigid designation, which 
states that some expressions, among which are proper names, designate the same referent in 
every possible world (Kripke 1972:49). In terms of the earlier example: It is possible to think 
of Barack Obama not being president, but it is not possible of thinking of Barack Obama as 
not being ‘Barack Obama’. Kripke and Putnam (1975) suggested, that this even might count 
for pronouns and certain common nouns like ‘water’, so called  natural kinds. Accordingly, 
what we know as water and may define as ‘watery stuff’, is referred to by a clausal chain and 
therefore, if there was a possible world where there was some watery stuff that would meet all 
descriptions we have for water, but was in fact chemically different, it could not be referred to 
as water (Putnam 1975).
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Van Langendonck (2007:36) rejects this expanded use of direct reference and argues that only 
proper names directly refer rigidly, whereas natural kinds are rigid due to the rigidity of their 
sense. He makes a distinction between the lexical item of a proper name, which he calls a 
proper lemma and its actual use as a proper name. Further, he argues that proper names have 
sense  in  the  form of  associative  and categorical  meaning3,  which  in  primary use  doesn’t 
determine the referent or contribute to the propositional content of an utterance. But they can 
also  be  used  as  common  nouns,  in  which  case  the  categorical  and  associative  meaning 
determines  the  reference  and  contributes  to  the  propositional  content  (Van  Langendonck 
2007:11). Thus, not every use of a proprial lemma is considered a proper name. As we will 
see in 1.2.3, this approach will be interesting in the case of brand names, which often are used 
as common nouns.
Evidence for direct reference theory comes from neurolinguistic research, such as Semenza & 
Zettin (1989), who reported the case of a brain-injured patient who suffered of a rare type of 
aphasia disturbance, that consisted in the inability of retrieving proper names,  whereas he 
showed  no  significant  trouble  with  retrieval  or  comprehension  of  common  nouns  and 
comprehension of proper names seemed intact as well.  In Semenza & Zettin (1988), they 
further showed that semantic cues didn’t help the patient retrieving names, which leads them 
to the assumption, that proper names are directly referential. Also, they state that the mental 
lexicon might be organized in categories, where names would have their own category. 
These findings were further supported by a study by Bayer (1991), which was translated and 
summarized by Van Langendock (2007:110-12): In this study, Bayer reports the case of a 
patient suffering from ‘deep dyslexia’, who can not process words via grapheme-phoneme 
transmission,  but  instead  interprets  words  and  morphemes  holistically,  skipping  the 
phonological resolution and instead directly accessing her semantic lexicon. When it came to 
common nouns, this patient frequently exhibited paralexia, where, when asked to read a word, 
she would name a semantically related word instead. However, she was basically unable to 
read proper names. Van Langendonck attributed this to the weak semantic content in proper 
names.
As we have seen, more recent proponents of the direct reference theory don’t necessarily deny 
the  existence  of  some sort  of  sense  in  proper  nouns,  with some,  like  Van Langendonck, 
3 The categorical meaning of the name John for example would include the categorical meaning ‘man’.
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admitting that proper names have associative and categorical meaning. One thing all direct 
referentialists can agree on, is that proper names don’t contribute any propositional content to 
the expression they are used in apart from denoting their referent. Further, the semantic sense 
of proper names except from categorical or associative meaning is regarded non-existent or 
very weak. In terms of my study, one could conclude that brand names, granted they are 
proper names, should be expected to show weaker or no priming effects, if the strict direct 
reference theory is true, while a less stricter version of the theory, such as proposed by Van 
Langendonck, could explain semantic priming effects due to the categorical meaning.
1.2.3 Are Brand Names Proper Names?
Even though brand names are usually considered as a subcategory of proper names,  they 
exhibit some deviating behavior compared to other common names. In particular, they appear 
much more often with a definite article, as in  Could you give me the pepsi?. This was also 
observed by Semenza & Zettin (1988), who excluded brand names such as Coca-Cola from 
their  study,  “since there is  no way of being sure how a subject  would represent  them in 
his/her  semantic  system”,  arguing  that,  even  though  they  are  proper  names,  they  were 
“somewhat ambiguous” (Semenza & Zettin 1988:714). Indeed, Gonjito et al. (2002) suggest, 
that brand names should be assigned a special neuropsychological status,  as they were, just 
like proper names, significantly less lateralized than common nouns. Nonetheless, in their 
experiment, a lateral lexical decision task4, they found that brand names behave much like 
common nouns in exhibiting significant length effect, i.e. increasingly higher reaction times 
the more characters a word has, only in the left visual field.
However, some of the special behavior of brand names might stem from the fact, that the 
category ‘brand names’ might be misleading. Instead, one might look at brand names as a 
heterogeneous group consisting of common nouns and proper names. If, like in Gonjto et al. 
(2002), these different nouns are treated as one group, the results might be misleading. Darren 
Schmidt (2011) conducted a lexical decision task, testing brand names, proper names and 
common  nouns.  He  divided  brand  names  into  two  groups,  ambiguous  brand  names  and 
unambiguous brand names.  Ambiguous  brand names  are  brand names,  that  are  used  like 
common nouns, not showing the typical grammatical features of proper names (see chapter 
1.2), whereas non-ambiguous brand names behave like prototypical proper names. In terms of 
4 a lexical decision task, where the participant’s head is fixated and words are presented either on the left side 
or the right side of the visual field
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reaction  times,  ambiguous  brand  names  were  quite  similar  to  common  nouns  and  both 
produced lower reaction times than non-ambiguous brand names and proper names. However, 
he too concludes that brand names might have a special status.
I would instead argue, that some brand names, the one Schmidt (2011) called ambiguous, are 
common nouns, whereas others are proper names. It is not unusual, that proper names over 
the course of time change their lexical status and become common nouns. A famous example 
is the Latin name Caesar, that later was used as a byname by the roman emperor and later 
became the common noun  Kaiser (meaning ‘emperor’)  in German (see Kluge & Seebold 
2001:460). In American jurisprudence, the case of a brand name becoming a common noun is 
subject to legal disputes, as a brand can be deleted from the federal trademark register as soon 
as it becomes a status as generic common noun not only for the branded product but also for 
similar  products  from other  brands (see  Folsom & Teply 1980) and strategies  have  been 
developed to avoid brand names becoming generic,  a  process  referred  to  as  “genericide” 
(Taylor & Walsh 2002). One of the famous examples for a brand name becoming a common 
noun is cola, which the Coca-Cola company unsuccefully tried to defend as their trademark, 
and which subsequently shifted from using Cola to Coke (see ibid.). As Schmidt (2011) has 
shown,  brand  names  which  appear  as  common  nouns  show  similar  reaction  times  as 
prototypical common nouns in lexical decision tasks, whereas it is not quite clear, whether 
proper  names  are  generally  processed  slower  than  common  nouns  (Gontijo  et  al.  2002, 
Schmidt 2011) or at the same speed (Peressotti et al. 2003).
Whether one is willing to follow my assumption, that the label ‘brand names’ actually refers 
to a group consisting of proper names and common nouns or not: When it comes to semantic 
meaning  of  brand  names,  it  is  very  like  that  they  have  at  least  some  associative  and 
categorical meaning, such as Van Langendonck (2011) assumes it for proper names, or even 
semantic sense as we find it in common nouns. A study by Crutch & Warrington (2004) based 
on  a series of experiment  with a patient suffering from semantic access dysphasia showed 
that, when asked to assign a matching picture from a selection of four pictures to a brand 
name or proper name, the patient had problems assigning brand names to the correct picture 
of  the  brand  product  when  the  other  pictures  showed  products  from  the  same  product 
category. A similar effect was observed for person names, where the patient scored worse in 
assigning  the  right  picture  to  a  person  name,  when  the  other  pictures  presented  showed 
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persons who had the same profession as the person in question. This can be interpreted as 
evidence that proper names are organized by associative or categorical meaning.
1.3 Conclusions for the experiment
Over the past decades, it seems as though the main difference between the direct reference 
theory and the intermediate or indirect reference theory has narrowed down to the question, 
whether  or not names contribute to the propositional content of an expression apart  from 
denoting their referent (cf. Sullivan 2006), while some of the proponents of the two different 
theories would agree on proper names having some meaning (e.g. Van Langendonck 2007 and 
Katz  2001),  even  though  it  is  more  rudimentary  compared  to  proper  nouns.  As  for  the 
question, if the meaning of the word or meaning associated to the referent contributes to the 
propositional content of an expression, my experiment will not bring any answers, as this 
seems to be more of a philosophical question. But when it comes to the sense of brand names, 
it  might do so, at  least  when it  comes to the stricter direct reference-account,  that proper 
names, including brand names, have no or very limited semantic content. If that was true, then 
brand names in this experiment should not show priming effects, or at least much weaker 
priming effects than common nouns. It is that stricter, older position of direct reference theory 
that is often argued for in psycho- and neurolinguistic studies (eg. Semenze & Zettin 1988, 
1989, Bayer 1991, Gontijo et al. 2002). 
Referring the question of reaction times for common nouns and brand names, we might get 
some  interesting  results  from  the  unprimed  version  of  the  experiment.  It  is  a  known 
phenomenon  that  words  with  little  semantic  richness  exhibit  higher  reaction  times  than 
semantically rich words (see Pexman et al. 2003, Robert & Duarte 2016). If thus the brand 
names in this experiment would show significantly higher reaction times than the common 
nouns, this would support the views, that proper names have no or only rudimentary semantic 
content.
Regarding the nature of the words summarized under the label ‘brand names’, the experiment 
might  not  bring  any  more  clarity,  since  I  chose  to  use  both  brand  names  that  act  like 
prototypical proper names and brand names, that act more like common nouns, in convention 
with the predominant view that brand names are a homogenous group. To find significant 
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differences between different types of brand names, one would have to conduct an experiment 




This chapter describes the theoretic framework and motivation of the experiment as well the 
technical implementation and the stimulus used.
The general idea with the experiment was to measure reaction times on primed and unprimed 
brand names and common nouns, in order to see if priming effects and/or reaction times differ 
between those two categories. In the first sub-chapter, 2.1, I will account for the use a lexical 
decision task with reaction time-measurement as the tool of choice and why priming effects 
were investigated. Also, the research hypotheses will be presented and motivated.
The second sub-chapter, 2.2, describes the selection of the stimulus, including a description of 
the non-words  
Sub-chapter  2.3 gives  an overview of the participants in  terms of  age,  gender  and social 
background.
2.1 – Theoretic Framework of the Experiment
The design of the experiment can be summarized as a reaction time-measuring unmasked 
primed lexical decision task. In 2.1.1, I will state and explain the research hypotheses. Sub-
chapter 2.1.2 gives a definition of lexical decision tasks and summarizes what assumptions 
they are based on and what reaction times can tell us about the mental processes involved in 
these kind of tasks. In 2.1.3 I will have a closer look at the nature of semantic priming and the 
history of research on that issue.
2.1.1 Research Hypothesis
As pointed out in chapter 1, there are good reasons to believe that there might be a difference 
in priming effects on brand names and proper nouns due to different lexical features. Also, it 
is not quite clear whether reaction times for brand names are generally higher or lower than 
for proper nouns, whereas differences in reaction times between these two categories could 
tell as a lot about the question, whether brand names have semantic content.
This leads to the following two null-hypotheses:
NH1: ‘Priming effect is the same for brand names and common nouns’
NH2: ‘Reaction time patterns are the same for brand names and common nouns’ 
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And the corresponding alternative hypotheses:
AH1: ‘Priming effect is different for brand names and common nouns’
AH2: ‘Reaction time patterns are different for brand names and common nouns’.
To test the first null hypothesis, date from both the primed and the unprimed version will be 
analyzed and compared. To test the second null hypothesis, data from the unprimed version 
will be analyzed.
2.1.2 Reaction Times and Lexical Decision Tasks
Lexical decision tasks in connection with reaction time measuring have been one of the most 
common  tools  in  psycholinguistic  research.  Some  of  the  first  one  to  conduct  priming 
experiments involving word recognition with the reaction time being measured were Thomas 
K. Landauer and Jonathan L. Freedman in 1968 (see Landauer & Freedman 1968), based on 
earlier experiments with a word recognition layout (e.g. Solomon & Howes 1951). From back 
then, the basic setup has not changed a lot. A string of letters is shown to a participant, who 
then has to decide whether or not that string is a word, by pressing one of two buttons, one for 
‘yes’ and one for  ‘no’.  The reaction time,  that  is  the time passing from the onset  of the 
stimulus until a reaction has been recorded, is then recorded for each of the letter strings. 
When, as in the case of my study, a prime stimulus is used before the target stimulus, the 
reaction  time  is  measured  from the  onset  of  the  target  stimulus.  At  the  same  time,  the 
correctness  of  the  answer  will  be  recorded.  A high  percentage  of  wrong  answers  for  a 
particular  word  for  example  would  indicate  an  average  low  familiarity  with  that  word, 
whereas a high error rate with a non-word can indicate that the participants were tricked by 
the non-word’s phonotactical well-formedness (see Berent et al. 2001).
The general idea behind measuring the reaction time in lexical decision tasks, is that the more 
complex the mental process behind word recognition is, the higher the reaction time will be 
(Garman  1990,  Traxler  2012).  This  counts  even  for  non-words:  It  takes  longer  to  reject 
phonotactically legit non-words than to accept real words. This can be explained with the 
lexical system unsuccessfully trying to find the corresponding phonological representation, 
which is “exhaustive and fruitless” (Garman 1990:268).
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2.1.3 – Priming
A simple definition of priming is provided by Traxler (2012, p. 84):  
“Priming occurs when presenting one stimulus at time 1 helps people respond to  
another stimulus at time 2”. 
Nowadays, priming is a well-known phenomenon within linguistics and psychology and a lot 
of  research  has  been done  in  that  area.  Probably one  of  the  earliest  examples  of  lexical 
decision tasks investigating priming effects by means of reaction times was conducted by 
David E. Meyer and Roger W. Schvaneveldt in 1971. They discovered that subjects needed 
significantly less time to identify a pair of strings as real words, when those two words were 
associatively  or  semantically  related,  such  as  “BREAD”,  “BUTTER”  or  “NURSE”, 
“DOCTOR” (Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971). Even though the two strings were presented at 
the same time, the observed effects fall under Traxler's definition, since the subjects, as Meyer 
and Schvaneveldt pointed out,  obviously read the two words one after another.  Note that 
Meyer and Schvaneveldt didn’t distinct between semantic priming and associated priming, 
with  some pairs,  like  “BREAD” and  “BUTTER”,  being  mostly associatively connected5, 
while pairs such as “DOCTOR” and “NURSE” were also semantically related. While Meyer 
and Schvaneveldt were among the first ones to conduct experiments on priming, they were far 
from being the first ones to describe general priming effects. Bargh (2014) notices that Karl 
Lashley (1951) described carryover effects already as early as 1951.
The  difference  between  semantic  priming  and  associative  priming  lies  in  the  connection 
between the concepts. When two concepts are associatively related, they often co-occur, that 
is they are often used in the same context, such as “police” and “jail”. They don’t necessarily 
share  common  properties.  Semantically  related  words  on  the  other  hand  share  common 
features, for example “horse” and “pig”, who are both mammals, both domesticated and so on 
(cf. Traxler 2012). However, as the examples from Meyer and Schaneveldt’s (1971) study 
show, words are often related in both ways and it isn’t always easy to tell, whether a priming 
effect was caused by associative or semantic relatedness.
It is important to note, that there is some evidence leading to the conclusion that priming by 
association and semantic priming should be treated as two different effects (Perea & Rosa 
2002). The stimulus used in this experiment was mainly semantically related, as semantic 
relationship  in  terms  of  hyperonomy is,  in  the  matter  of  brand  names,  methodologically 
5 Of course one can argue, that there is some semantic relationship, too. Bread and butter are both comestible  
goods, but certainly the associative connection is much stronger here.
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cleaner to determine than associative priming. As one can see in appendix 1, frequencies for 
brand names tend to be rather low, thus a corpus-based selection of co-occuring nouns for 
these brand names would have been based on too little numbers to produce reliable results.
Semantic priming effects can be explained with the Semantic network theory, which says that 
“a word’s meaning is represented by a set of  nodes and the  links  between them” (Traxler 
2012:83). This network of links between these nodes facilitates  spreading activation: When 
activating the node representing one word, activation of other nodes who are connected to that 
node occurs.  The more common properties a  concept  shares  with the originally activated 
concept, the stronger the co-activation will be (see Collins & Loftus 1975). The so activated 
concepts can again activate other concepts who share common properties with them, but not 
necessarily with the originally activated concept (Traxler 2012:85). This way, even words that 
aren’t  directly  semantically  related  can  cause  priming  effects  on  words  through  an 
intermediate  concept  that  shares  properties  with  both  the  prime  and  the  target  word’s 
concepts, such as “MANE” and “TIGER”, mediated through “LION” (McNamara & Altarriba 
1988). However, “the amount of activation that arrives at a node is a decreasing function of 
the number of nodes the activation has traversed” (Ratcliff & McKoon 1981), that means the 
priming effect through mediate activation is weaker than through direct activation and the 
more nodes there are in between, the weaker the effect, until it finally fades out. Spreading 
activation is an automatic and subconscious process, that happens very fast and can not be 
controlled (cf. Traxler 2012:84).
In  the  execution  of  priming  experiments,  one  can  differ  between  masked  priming  and 
unmasked priming. While in unmasked priming, the prime stimulus is immediately followed 
by the target stimulus, in masked priming a brief exposure to the prime stimulus is directly 
followed by a graphic pattern mask with the same dimensions as the prime stimulus, which 
then  itself  is  followed  by the  target  stimulus.  Generally,  in  addition  to  the  pattern  mask 
impeding the conscious perception of the prime stimulus, the time interval in which the prime 
stimulus is presented, tends to be shorter in masked priming setups. As a result, the subjects in 
the experiment are usually not able to consciously read the prime word or even notice there 
being a prime word at all (cf. Garman 1990). According to Garman (1990:294), the “semantic 
priming effect is observed even where the subject cannot report the existence or identity of the 
first, masked, word”. Masked priming experiments thus gives further evidence, that priming is 
an automatic and subliminal process, and can be used to avoid expectancy, i.e. the paticipant 
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adapting an intentional  strategy to  conclude on the target  stimulus by analyzing assumed 
patterns in the prime stimulus (see McNamara 2005).
In both masked and unmasked experiments, the priming effect increases to a certain degree 
with higher stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), which is the time interval between the onset of 
the prime stimulus and the onset of the target stimulus. However, long SOAs of more than 
1000ms can lead to higher reaction times and eventually a reduced priming effect (De Groot 
et al. 1986, Vorberg et al. 2003). Having in mind that the difference in priming effects on 
brand names and common nouns might to be rather small and hard to detect, I used an SOA of 
200ms in this experiment, which increases the priming effect compared to the use of SOAs of 
50 or 100ms. 
2.2 – About the Stimulus
In this  study, I used three types of target stimuli: 48 Non-words, 48 brand names and 24 
common  nouns.  All  words  used  were  Norwegian,  the  brands  were  partially  Norwegian, 
partially  international,  but  all  of  them were  used  in  Norway and  could  be  found  in  the 
Norwegian Newspaper Corpus Bokmål (2016). The detailed list of the stimuli,  along with 
their frequencies, is documented in Appendix 1. In the primed version of the experiment, 
these were paired with common nouns as prime stimulus.
Prime (only in primed 
version)
Target Class
brus PEPSI related brand a
brus COCA-COLA related brand b
brus SOLO related brand c
brus COLA related word
sesong GOOGLE unrelated brand
eple SOFA unrelated word
kasse TRÅRNE non-word
Table 1: Examples for the different stimulus classes
The experiment consisted of three blocks as described in chapter 2.4. Within each block, 5 
different classes of items were presented: 12 related brands, 12 related words, 12 unrelated 
brands, 12 unrelated words and 48 non-words. Both in the primed and in the unprimed version 
of  the experiment,  the non-words and the common nouns were the same in all  the three 
blocks, as well as a part of the brand names (those tagged as ‘unrelated brand’ in the stimuli  
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list in appendix 1 and in table 1). For these items, only the reaction times from the first block 
were used. Only the brand names tagged as ‘related brand’ varied for each block, with Block 
A using the brands marked as ‘related brand a’, Block B using ‘related brand b’ and Block C 
using “related brand c”. The block order for each participant can be seen in App. 1.
In the primed version, the following pairs of prime and target stimuli were used:
‘related word’ and ‘related brand’
Related pairs consisted of a common noun as prime stimulus and a brand name or a common 
noun as target stimulus. Pairs with a common noun in the target position were tagged as 
‘related word’ and pairs with a brand name in the target position were tagged as ‘related 
brand’. The targets were chosen such that there was a common noun describing a product or 
service and three names of brands operating in that field of business, for example  COLA, 
PEPSI, COCA-COLA, SOLO. The corresponding prime word was a common noun acting as a 
hyperonym  to  the  targets,  i.e.  as  a  superordinate  category  or  concept,  including  other 
categories or concepts (Cruse 2006), as depicted in fig.2. In this example, the prime stimulus 
would be  BRUS (=“soft drink“). The brand names used were partially prototypical proper 
names (eg.  Telenor),  whereas others are less prototypical  (e.g.  Pepsi),  reminding more of 
common nouns than of proper names (see chap. 1.2.3).
‘Unrelated’ pair
Unrelated pairs consisted of a common noun as prime stimulus and an unrelated brand name 
or common noun as target, such as område and SAMSUNG or gate and BOKS. The pairs with 
a common noun as target were tagged as ‘unrelated word’ and the ones with a brand name in 
the target position were tagged as ‘unrelated brand’.
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Figure 2: Relation between the targets and the primes in related pairs
Non-word pairs
Non-word pairs consisted of a common noun as prime stimulus and a non-word as target, 
such as kasse and TRÅRNE.
The  non-words  were designed to  be  phonotactically well-formed in Norwegian,  since ill-
formed non-words are more likely to be excluded as potential words and therefore rejected 
more quickly (Berent et al. 2001). Most non-words were created using Wuggy (Keuleers & 
Brysbaert 2010), a multi-lingual non-word generator with which the letters of the 200 most 
frequent common nouns found in the Norwegian Newspaper Corpus (2016) were rearranged 
in a phonotactically well-formed way. 
In the unprimed version,  who served as baseline to  test  priming effects,  the same list  of 
stimuli was used, limited on the target stimuli, as no prime stimulus was used. The target 
words were tagged with the same tags as the corresponding words from the primed version, to 
simplify analysis. Note that the names for the different stimuli-classes are just labels. When 
talking about ‘related words’ in the unprimed version of the experiment, this serves only the 
purpose of pointing out, that the nouns subsumed under this label are the same as the ones 
who  were  used  as  target  stimulus  in  related  word-pairs  in  the  primed  version  of  the 
experiment. The same goes for ‘related brands’. ‘Unrelated words’ are common nouns and 
‘unrelated  brands’ are  brands,  which in  the primed version have been used in  pairs  with 
unrelated common nouns as prime stimulus. I chose to use the word ‘word’ in the labels, 
because it is shorter than the term ‘common noun’, and since both proper names and common 
nouns are usually seen as nouns, the word ‘word’ isn’t more ambiguous than the word ‘noun’ 
might have been in that context.
2.3 – Participants
The 36 participants6 were mainly students  who were recruited  from a student  pub in the 
Faculty of Humanities at the University of Bergen. They participated voluntarily and without 
compensation. The participant’s age ranged from 19 to 30 years, with an average age of 23,92 
years, a median of 24 and a mode of 22. Out of 36 participants, 13 (36,1%) were female and 
23 were male. All participants were native speakers of Norwegian. Half of the participants 
6 The  results  from  one  participant,  subject-number  007,  could  not  be  used  due  to  a  technical  problem. 
Therefore, the number 007 is missing in the participant list.
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took  part  in  the  primed version  of  the  experiment,  while  the  other  half  took part  in  the 
unprimed version.
For a detailed list of the participants, see App. 2.
2.4 – Technical Setup and Procedure of the Experiment
The experiment was conducted in  a sound-insulated room, using the experiment software 
Cedrus SuperLab and a Cedrus RB-530 response pad with 5 buttons, one of them red and one 
of them green (see fig. 3). SuperLab was running on a MacOS system, connected via HDMI-
port to a 24” display with 4ms response time.
Prospect participants were interviewed on their proficiency in Norwegian to ensure that all 
participants were literate and spoke Norwegian on a native level. They were advised of the 
fact that, during the course of the experiment, they would be exposed to a flickering screen, to 
prevent  triggering  of  photosensitive  epilepsy.  When  found  eligible  for  participation,  the 
participants' age and gender was registered (see Appendix 2). The participants were assigned a 
participant number, to ensure anonymity. Then an oral summary of the instructions for the 
experiment (see Appendix 3) was given, with emphasis on the fact that the participation is 
strictly voluntarily and that the participants are free to leave the experiment at any given time. 
In addition, participants in the primed version of the experiment were instructed to react only 
on the target words written in capitals, not to the prime words written in small letters. At the 
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Figure 3: Drawing of the Response Box Design used in the Experiment
beginning  of  each  block,  the  before  mentioned  instructions  in  Norwegian  language  were 
displayed on the screen and the participants were asked to start the experiment by pressing 
any button as soon as they had read and understood the instructions.
The stimulus was presented in three blocks as described in 2.2. Each block started with 6 
warm-up events, where the response was not recorded. Each of the block had a pause after 49 
events, with the pause screen reading “Please take a break. Press any key when you are ready 
to continue”. The participants were orally instructed to take this pause as long as they wanted 
and could proceed with the rest of the block by pressing any button on the response pad. After 
each block, a message appeared, asking the participants to inform the experimenter in order to 
start the next block of the experiment. The blocks were manually randomized, the block order 
for each participant is documented in Appendix 2. The next block then was started manually 
by the experimenter. This procedure stems from the original plan of conducting the study in a 
way that each participant would only be presented one of the three blocks. This plan was later 
abandoned due to the much higher number of participants required for that approach. While it 
would  have  been  technically  easy  to  present  the  three  blocks  fully  automatically  to  the 
participant, the manual solution was kept for several reasons. Trial runs of the experimental 
setup had shown that participants tended to take rather short breaks, often around 4-5 seconds. 
The manual solution led to the participants getting a longer (forced) break after each of the 
blocks, to prevent fatigue or eye irritation from staring at the screen and at the same time gave 
the experimenter the opportunity to ask them if they experienced any irregularities7. Since 
only the items from the related brand names-class differed between the three blocks, with the 
related nouns, the unrelated nouns, the unrelated brand names and the non-words being the 
same, one could expect a learning effect on the other items. Therefore, only the reaction times 
for the related brand names-pairs were used from the respective second and third block.
The stimulus, the instructions etc. were presented in black letters centered on an eggshell-
white (color code in RGB: R235 G235 B208) background. The color was chosen, as it had 
shown that it was perceived more comfortable than black letters on an all-white background.
Every event started with a fixation point +, visible for 1000ms, which in the unprimed version 
of  the  experiment  was  followed directly  by the  target  stimulus  written  in  capital  letters8, 
7 During one trial test run, an error message popped up and disrupted the experiment for some seconds. If this  
had happened during the course of an actual experiment, it would have been a reason to stop the experiment  
and spare the participant the effort of going through the remaining blocks, since the recorded data couldn't  
have been used anyway. 
8 Capital letters were chosen to avoid orthographic cues, see Peressoti et al. (2003)
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displayed  until  either  the  green  or  the  red  button  had  been  pushed.  If  after  3000ms  no 
feedback had been recorded, the event was recorded as a non-response and the next event 
started. The primed version differed in the fixation point being followed by a prime stimulus, 
displayed for 200ms, then followed by the target stimulus.
Thus, the events in the two versions of the experiment looked like this:
Unprimed version:
+ (1000ms) → TARGET (max. 3000ms or until response)
Primed version:
+ (1000ms) → prime (200ms) → TARGET (max. 3000ms or until response)
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3 – Results and Analysis
The following chapter describes the statistical analysis of the results of the two versions of the 
experiment,  i.e.  the primed version and the unprimed version.  The experiment resulted in 
4320 data sets, 2160 for each version. See App. 4 for detailed plots of the reaction times by 
stimulus type for each participant. All data sets with wrong answers and non-responses were 
excluded from the analysis, resulting in 2037 remaining data sets for the primed version and 
2009 data sets for the unprimed version. For each version, a separate outlier analysis was 
done, removing every data set whose reaction time ranged below 150ms and above 2000ms.
In the primed version, 20 outliers, i.e. 0,982%  were removed, in the unprimed version, 10 
outliers, i.e. 0,498% were removed. Mean for related brands9 was 713.41ms in the primed 
version and 723.83ms in the unprimed version and mean for related words was 755.68ms in 
the primed version and 762.36ms in the unprimed version.
9 Remember that related brands, related words, unrelated brands and unrelated words are labels for a group of 
target words (see chapter 2), that were used both in the primed and in the unprimed version. The labels are  
based on the fact, that these words were either primed with a related or an unrelated word in the primed 
version of the experiment.
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Figure 4: Reaction time per stimulus type for each experiment version
3.1 Null Hypothesis 1 and Alternative Hypothesis 1
In order to test the null-hypothesis NH1 ‘Priming effect is the same for brand names and 
common nouns’ and the alternative hypothesis  AH1 ‘Priming effect  is  different  for brand 
names and common nouns’, it had to be established if there were indeed any priming effects 
for brands and nouns, as the existence of priming effects for at least one of the latter is a 
presupposition to the alternative hypothesis. To do this, both a Welch two sample t-test and a 
linear mixed effects analysis with ANOVA model analysis was performed (see Winter 2013) 
both for related brands and related words separately, comparing the data from primed version 
with  the  data  from the  unprimed version  as  baseline.  Prior  to  every test  in  this  and the 
following analysis, aShapiro-Wilk normality tests for the dataframes were conducted.
The two sample t-test for related brands, modeling mean reaction time by experiment version 
(see fig. 5), i.e. primed or unprimed10, showed no significant priming effect, with p = 0.3702.
To confirm this, a linear mixed effect model test was conducted. The data was analyzed with 
the formula  rt ~ trial + (1 | participant) + (1 | target), where  rt stands for the dependent 
measure reaction time and the fixed effect  trial  stands for the experiment version. Different 
intercepts for participant and target, i.e. item, were used. In the null-model, the fixed effect 
10 A two sample t-test comparing reaction times for related brands and unrelated brands in the primed version 
showed significant effects for the stimulus group, with p = 0.00909. However, this is most likely caused by 
inhibitory effects of the unrelated prime words for unrelated brands (see McNamara 2005).
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Figure 5: Reaction times for related brands by experiment version
“trial” was removed. ANOVA showed no significance for an effect of trial type, with p = 
0.6678 and χ² = 0.1842, thus no significance for priming effects for brand names.
The models for related words were build up the same way (see fig. 6). The two sample t-test 
showed no significance for priming effects, with p = 0.7737. ANOVA for the linear mixed 
effect models showed no significance for priming effects on related words either, with p = 
0.8662 and χ² = 0.0284.
Thus, no priming effects on neither brand nor common nouns were observed.
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Figure 6: Reaction times for related words by experiment version
Figure 7: Reaction times for unrelated words by experiment version
As an additional test, unrelated words were tested for inhibitory priming effects with a two 
sample t-test on reaction time by trial type, i.e. primed/unprimed (see. fig.  7). The mean for 
unrelated  words  in  the  primed version  was 767.02ms,  against  698.61ms in the  unprimed 
version. As expected from the mean, the t-test showed high significance with t = 3.4336, df = 
405.3 and p = 0.0006571.
The same test was applied on unrelated brands (see fig.  8), showing high significance for 
inhibition effects, with t = 2.5904, df = 393.14 and p = 0.009944. Mean for the primed version 
was 753.90ms and for the unprimed version, the mean was 710.19ms. Thus, a linear mixed 
effects models test was conducted to see if the stimulus type, i.e. brand name or common 
noun, had any effect on the size of the inhibitory effect, testing the model rt ~ stimulus + trial  
+(1|participant) against  the  null-model  rt  ~  trial  +(1|participant).  ANOVA showed  no 
significant effect of stimulus on inhibition effects, with χ²= 0.0014 and p = 0.9699.
No priming effects were found for both brand names and common nouns. Inhibitory priming 
effects in terms of longer reaction times were found for unrelated brands and unrelated words. 
However, no significant difference in inhibitory priming effects based on stimulus type was 
found, inhibition effects on brand names did not differ significantly from inhibition effects on 
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Figure 8: Reaction times for unrelated brands by experiment version
common  nouns.  That  means,  the  null  hypothesis  NH1  is  confirmed  and  the  alternative 
hypothesis AH1 was rejected: Priming effect is the same for brand names and common nouns.
3.1.1 Priming effects for individual brand names
If one takes a look at the plot in fig. 9, p.37, it might seem as if some brand names could show 
priming effects,  e.g.  Grandiosa,  or  BigOne,  while  others,  such as  Primark  or  Kjeldsberg 
seemed to show a reversed effect. However, almost no priming effects for the individual brand 
names could be detected.
All related brands were individually tested with a two samlpe t-test for rt ~ trial, i.e. reaction 
time by primed/unprimed. Only Koss showed significant priming effects, with p = 0.03483. 
Other brands who had almost significant effects were Chess, with p = 0.058 and Grandiosa, 
with p = 0.059.
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Figure 9: Reaction times per item by experiment version for related brand names
3.2 Null-hypothesis 2 and Alternative Hypothesis 2
To test the null-hypothesis NH2 ‘Reaction time patterns are the same for brand names and 
common nouns’ and the alternative hypothesis AH2 ‘Reaction time patterns are different for 
brand names and common nouns’, data from the unprimed version of the experiment was 
used. All brands, i.e. both the ones tagged as related brand and the one tagged as unrelated 
brand, were subsumed under the tag brand, whereas related words and unrelated words were 
subsumed under the tag word and both were merged into one single data frame. Mean reaction 
time  for  combined  brand names  was  at  720.24ms  and mean  reaction  time  for  combined 
common nound was at 730.95ms (see fig. 10).
The linear mixed effects model had the formula  rt ~ stimulus + (1 | participant), with the 
fixed effect stimulus standing for the stimulus type, brand or common noun.
The null-model had the same formula, except for stimulus being removed. ANOVA analysis 
of the two models showed no effect for the stimulus type on the reaction time, with p = 
0.3082 and χ² =  1.0383.
However, a two sample t-test comparing reaction times for related words and related brands in 
the  unprimed  version  (see.  fig.  11)  showed  significance  for  the  stimulus  type,  with  t  = 
-2.0692, df = 304.35 and p = 0.03937, with the mean for related brands at 723.83ms and for 
related words at 762.36ms. To confirm this finding, a linear mixed effects model was built, 
with the formula  rt ~ stimulus + (1 | participant) and the null-model  rt ~ (1 | participant). 
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Figure 10: Reaction times for brand names and nouns in the unprimed 
version
ANOVA showed high significance for the effect of stimulus type on the reaction time, with χ² 
= 6.8389 and p = 0.00892.
A two sample t-test comparing reaction times for unrelated words and unrelated brands in the 
unprimed version on the other hand show no significance, with p = 0.5036.
That means that the alternative hypothesis AH2 was rejected due to lack of unambiguous 
evidence. However, the null-hypothesis NH2 can not be confirmed without any doubts. The 
findings are ambiguous and it can’t be ruled out with absolute certainty that reaction time 
patterns might differ for brand names and common nouns.
3.3 Summary of the significant findings
The analysis of the experiment data indicates no priming effects for both related brands and 
related words as a whole. In individual analysis, no significant priming effects were found for 
most  brand  names  except  for  one.  Highly  significant  inhibitory  effects  were  found  for 
unrelated brands (p < 0.01) and unrelated words (p < 0.001) with a two sample t-test, but no 
significant difference in priming effect for unrelated brands and unrelated words was found 
through a linear mix effects model analysis with ANOVA.
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Figure 11: Reaction times for related words and related brand names in the 
unprimed version
Null-hypothesis NH1 is confirmed: Priming effect is the same for brand names and common 
nouns.
For the question of reaction times, the analysis of the unprimed experiment version gave no 
clear result. For parts of the stimulus, related brands and related words, significantly shorter 
reaction times for brand names than for common nouns were found (p < 0.01 in linear mixed 
effects ANOVA and p < 0.05 in a two samlpe t-test). However, no significance was found for 
the total  group of brand names versus common nouns,  as well  as no significance for the 




This chapter deals with the interpretation of the findings in the analysis. I will discuss how 
these findings can be explained by existing theories and where these findings provide new 
information.
Subchapter 4.1 will deal with the findings connected to null-hypothesis NH1 and alternative 
hypothesis AH1, which addressed the question whether or not brand names and proper nouns 
are affected by priming effects the same way and to which the answer was, that there are no 
significant effects on priming size. Also, I will take a look at the inhibitory priming effects 
that  were  found  for  unrelated  brand  names  and  unrelated  proper  names  and  present  an 
explanation for them.
Subchapter 4.2 will discuss the issue of reaction times for brand names compared with those 
for common nouns, as expressed in the null-hypothesis NH2 and the alternative hypothesis 
AH2. A group of brand names had significantly lower reaction times than a group of common 
nouns,  while  for  brand  names  and  common  nouns  as  a  whole,  no  such  effect  could  be 
observed.
4.1 Priming effects on brand names and common nouns
As seen in chapter 3, there were no significant priming effects detectable during the analysis, 
neither  for  related  brands  nor  for  related  words.  Several  studies  indicated  that  semantic 
priming effects tend to be weaker and less reliable than associative priming effects (Lucas 
2000, Perea & Rosa 2002) and that pairs which are purely semantically related evoke a neural 
response similar to the one evoked by unrelated pairs (cf. Traxler 2012: 86, see also Rhodes & 
Donaldson 2008). The lack of priming effects for related brands and related words might thus 
be a result of the focus on semantic relatedness instead of associative relatedness in this study. 
However, there were some interesting findings regarding inhibition effects: Reaction times for 
unrelated words and unrelated brands were significantly higher in the primed version than in 
the unprimed version, with p < 0.001 for unrelated words and p < 0.01 for unrelated brands. 
This complies with findings in other studies, who showed that unrelated prime stimulus leads 
to higher reaction times on the target stimulus (Lorch 1986, Eglin 1987, Neely et al. 1989,  
Nakamura et al. 2006).
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This can be explained in term of expectancy, which is based on a strategic attempt of the 
participant to predict the target word with the help of the prime word, thus activating potential 
categories and leading to a longer reaction time, when the target is unrelated and activation 
has  to  be  re-adjusted  (see  McNamara  2005:55-56).  Nakamura  et  al.  (2006)  argued  that 
inhibitory effects of unrelated prime-target pairs in lexical decision tasks where higher for 
children than for adults, because children have to rely more on expectancy than adults, since 
the links between nodes in their semantic network are less developed. The fact that brand 
names respond to inhibitory effects the same way as common nouns do, suggests that the 
recognition and processing of brand names is done in a similar way as it is done for common 
nouns, involving activation of the semantic information. As such, it seems improbable that the 
participants reacted on brand names solely based on the word-form.
If  one  applies  this  finding  to  the  question  of  whether  or  not  brand  names  are  directly 
referential, granted one assumes that brand names indeed are proper names, one might doubt 
the proposition of some direct referentialists that proper names don’t have semantic concepts. 
Inhibitory effects occur because the activation of the relevant semantic information is delayed 
due to prior activation of other potential categories. If brand names had no semantic property, 
no activation of semantic information would be required and thus there wouldn’t be anything 
that could be delayed. For the newer approaches to direct reference theory on the other hand 
(e.g. Van Langendonck 2007), expectancy-based inhibitory effects would not pose a problem, 
since categorical meaning is assumed for proper names, which would make them vulnerable 
for inhibitory effects as described above.
4.2 Reaction times for brand names and common nouns
The  findings  for  reaction  times  were  ambiguous  and  thus  the  alternative  theory  AH1 
“Reaction  time  patterns  are  different  for  brand names  and common nouns”  could  not  be 
confirmed. In overall analysis, no significant differences in reaction times could be found for 
brand names and common nouns. However, for some groups of stimulus, related brand and 
related words, significant differences in reaction times were found, with p < 0.05.  This might 
be caused by different frequency of the target words, which is known to effect reaction times 
(Solomon & Howes 1951, McGinnies et al. 1952, Balota & Chumley 1985, Traxler 2012). As 
mentioned earlier in chapter 2, it is rather difficult to analyze frequency for brand names by 
using written corpora like the Norwegian Newspaper Corpus. Looking at the data in appendix 
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1, it becomes obvious that the corpus is biased in terms of high frequencies for same brand 
names, whereas other brand names are obviously underrepresented, with a brand like Telenor 
having more than 20 times as many hits than Coca-Cola.
As Schmidt (2011) had shown, brand names that are used like common nouns show similar 
reaction  times  as  common  nouns,  whereas  in  his  study,  brand  names  that  are  more 
prototypical showed slower reaction times. The latter finding supports the results of Gontijo et 
al. (2002), who saw similar effects, whereas Peressotti et al. (2003) didn’t find any significant 
differences in reaction times for proper names. I would argue that the findings of my study 
point more towards similar reaction times for brand names,  in support of Peressotti  et  al. 
(2003). The brand names in the related brands-class contained both prototypical proper names 
as well as less prototypical proper names, whereas the unrelated brand-class contained only 
prototypical  proper  names,  who  fit  the  description  of  proper  names  given  by  Van 
Langendonck (2007), which I presented in chapter 1:
They can systematically appear  in  close appositional  structures,  as in “The search engine 
Google”.  They “do not take restrictive modifiers or quantifiers, cannot function as predicate 
nominals  and  are  the  weakest  anaphoric  elements”.  They  are  “inherently  definite”,  and 
“singular,  countable,  nonrecursive  and  show  third  person  on  the  lexical  level”  (Van 
Langendonck 2007:182).
A comparison of the reaction times for these prototypical brand with those of the common 
nouns in unrelated words showed no significant difference in reaction times. Even though the 
results  of the analysis  for related brands and related words raises some doubt,  the overall 
conclusion is that there is no difference in reaction times for brand names and common nouns. 
Referring to  the semantic  richness-theory,  stating  that  words  with little  semantic  richness 
produce higher reaction times (see Pexman et al. 2003, Robert & Duarte 2016), this indicates 
that the brand names used in this experiment have as much semantic content as the common 
nouns they were compared with.
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5 – Summary and outlook
As pointed out in chapter 1, there are different theories about the nature of brand names. 
Some linguists and philosophers state, that they are a subclass of proper names and that they 
are directly referential, whereas others state that proper names, just like common nouns, are 
referring indirectly through their semantic content. Based on these diverging theories, the two 
research hypotheses AH1: ‘Priming effect is different for brand names and common nouns’ 
and AH2: ‘Reaction time patterns are different for brand names and common nouns’ were 
formulated.
An unmasked reaction time-measuring primed lexical decision task, with an unprimed version 
as  baseline,  was  conducted,  with  brand  names,  common  nouns  and  non-words  as  target 
stimuli.  Five groups of stimuli  pairs  were formed: related brands and related words were 
primed with common nouns that were related to the target in terms of hyperonymy, the prime 
stimulus for unrelated brands, unrelated words and non-words were unrelated common nouns. 
SOA was 200ms.
The analysis of the data from both experiment versions showed no priming effects for neither 
brand names nor common nouns. This might be caused by the approach to use pure semantic 
priming instead of associative priming, which is known to produce weaker priming effects 
(see Lucas 2000, Perea & Rosa 2002). Inhibitory priming effects were found for unrelated 
brands  (p  <  0.01)  and  unrelated  words  (p  <  0.001),  which  might  be  explained  with 
expectancy. However, no significant difference for these effects on brand names and common 
nouns was found. Thus, AH1 has been rejected.
Also, no difference in reaction times was found when analyzing the results from the unprimed 
version of the experiment, except for words from the related word- and the related brand-
class,  where  the related  brands had significantly shorter  reaction times (p < 0.01).  These 
findings might be based on methodological problems, such as different frequencies for the 
target stimulus. For words in the unrelated word- and unrelated brand-class, no significant 
difference in reaction times were found, the same applies to an overall analysis comparing all 
brand names and common nouns from this experiment. AH2 was therefore rejected.
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5.1 Possible sources of error and suggestions for further research
As pointed out in chapter 4.2, the reaction times for related brands were significantly shorter 
than those for related words. This could be caused by different frequencies of the stimulus. 
Corpora of written language are not the optimal instrument to evaluate the actual frequency or 
familiarity of brands. In future experiments, a familiarity rating prior to the actual experiment 
(e.g. Schmidt 2011) would be a better way to balance the stimulus. Also, to test the theory that 
brand  names  is  a  class  consisting  of  proper  names  and  common  nouns,  one  should  test 
prototypical proper brand names and common noun-like brand names separately.
The inhibitory priming effect on unrelated words and unrelated brands showed that the use of 
unrelated pairs as baseline might result in false-positive prime effects for related pairs, if only 
compared with unrelated words (see Lorch et al. 1986).
It  might  be  interesting  to  conduct  a  similar  experiment  with  associative  priming,  since 
associative priming shows more consistent and stronger priming effects than pure semantic 
priming (Perea & Rosa 2002). As no priming effects were found in this experiment, it was not 
possible to clarify if brand names react differently on priming effects than common nouns. 
Since it is not very reliable to use corpora of written language for the analysis of co-occurence 
for brand names, a pre-study could be used to generate associative prime stimulus, e.g. by 
letting participants name the first word that comes into their mind when seeing a brand name 
target.  These  kinds  of  free  association  tasks  are  thought  to  activate  the  concept  with  the 




Frequency  taken  from  the  Norwegian  Newspaper  Corpus  Bokmål  (size:  1,517,106,226 
tokens) between 25/11 2015 and 11/07 2016, search string used:  "word" %c for nouns and 
brand names consisting of one word, "bergens" %c "tidende" %c for consisting of two words. 








hudpleie 316 NIVEA 172 related_brand_a
hudpleie 316 L'ORÉAL 179 related_brand_b
hudpleie 316 SPENOL 53 related_brand_c
bil 270402 VOLVO 22423 related_brand_a
bil 270402 VOLKSWAGEN 14407 related_brand_b
bil 270402 TESLA 4579 related_brand_c





avis 84642 DAGBLADET 440745 related_brand_c
kaffe 26057 FRIELE 4674 related_brand_a
kaffe 26057 EVERGOOD 51 related_brand_b
kaffe 26057 KJELDSBERG 976 related_brand_c
hurtigmat 641 MCDONALD'S 3954 related_brand_a
hurtigmat 641 BURGER KING 1550 related_brand_b
hurtigmat 641 SUBWAY 211 related_brand_c
mobilnett 2597 TELIA 7825 related_brand_a
mobilnett 2597 TELENOR 94227 related_brand_b
mobilnett 2597 CHESS 5220 related_brand_c
brus 8377 PEPSI 1960 related_brand_a
brus 8377 COCA-COLA 4034 related_brand_b
brus 8377 SOLO 4781 related_brand_c
godteri 4663 FREIA 1265 related_brand_a
godteri 4663 NIDAR 2147 related_brand_b
godteri 4663 MINDE 2897 related_brand_c









klær 48794 ZARA 1170 related_brand_b
klær 48794 PRIMARK 71 related_brand_c
hodetelefon 140 BOSE 385 related_brand_a
hodetelefon 140 KOSS 5344 related_brand_b
hodetelefon 140 BEATS 1701 related_brand_c
øl 47712 TUBORG 355 related_brand_a
øl 47712 HANSA 3557 related_brand_b
øl 47712 RINGNES 8086 related_brand_c
pizza 12013 GRANDIOSA 1509 related_brand_a
pizza 12013 DR. OETKER 145 related_brand_b
pizza 12013 BIGONE 50 related_brand_c
hudpleie 316 ANSIKTSKREM 65 related_word
bil 270402 STASJONSVOGN 7831 related_word
avis 84642 TABLOID 3590 related_word
kaffe 26057 ESPRESSO 1315 related_word
hurtigmat 641 HAMBURGER 3718 related_word
mobilnett 2597 TELESELSKAP 660 related_word
brus 7918 COLA 5325 related_word
godteri 4305 SJOKOLADE 12631 related_word
klær 45377 GENSER 3604 related_word
hodetelefon 128 HEADSET 411 related_word
øl 44640 PILS 4070 related_word
pizza 10840 MARGHERITA 272 related_word
liv 305081 LEVIS 241 unrelated_brand
uke 376625 ADIDAS 2376 unrelated_brand
regjering 120055 NORRØNA 732 unrelated_brand
område 80545 SAMSUNG 12013 unrelated_brand
menneske 40161 SONY 23919 unrelated_brand
penger 410342 NUGATTI 314 unrelated_brand
sesong 176328 GOOGLE 24923 unrelated_brand
side 261785 NRK 255688 unrelated_brand
tillegg 497469 SIEMENS 5929 unrelated_brand
bil 270402 COLGATE 382 unrelated_brand









spørsmål 256815 TINE 3207 unrelated_brand
eple 3674 SOFA 4642 unrelated_word
kino 40823 TÅKE 8094 unrelated_word
båt 62403 SNUS 10353 unrelated_word
rotte 1397 HYLLE 15020 unrelated_word
gate 60065 BOKS 15990 unrelated_word
ferie 59713 VITS 11979 unrelated_word
person 180116 STRØM 67024 unrelated_word
bok 91183 HUS 184583 unrelated_word
klubb 100753 FART 45196 unrelated_word
sak 156923 LOMME 4123 unrelated_word
plass 497985 FJES 4644 unrelated_word




































































Gender Year of Birth Age Version Block Order
001 f 1994 21 Primed ABC
002 m 1988 28 Primed ABC
003 f 1988 28 Primed BCA
004 m 1986 30 Primed BCA
005 m 1987 28 Primed CBA
006 m 1990 26 Primed CBA
008 m 1995 21 Primed ACB
009 f 1988 28 Primed BAC
010 m 1997 19 Primed BAC
011 f 1993 22 Primed CAB
012 f 1992 24 Primed CAB
013 m 1995 21 Primed ABC
014 m 1989 27 Primed BCA
015 m 1994 22 Primed CBA
016 m 1992 24 Primed ACB
017 f 1994 22 Primed BAC
018 f 1993 22 Primed CAB
019 f 1993 22 Primed ACB
020 m 1991 25 Unprimed ABC
021 m 1992 24 Unprimed ABC
022 m 1993 23 Unprimed ABC
023 f 1991 25 Unprimed BCA
024 f 1994 22 Unprimed BCA
025 m 1992 24 Unprimed BCA
026 m 1989 27 Unprimed CBA
027 m 1992 23 Unprimed CBA
028 f 1992 24 Unprimed CBA




Gender Year of Birth Age Version Block Order
030 m 1991 25 Unprimed ACB
031 f 1993 23 Unprimed ACB
032 m 1996 19 Unprimed BAC
033 m 1994 22 Unprimed BAC
034 m 1992 23 Unprimed BAC
035 m 1994 22 Unprimed CAB
036 m 1990 26 Unprimed CAB
037 f 1991 25 Unprimed CAB
-51-
Appendix 3: Instructions
Original Version (in Norwegian):
All deltagelse er frivillig og du kan forlate rommet når som helst.
Testene er anonyme, og det vil ikke bli lagret data knyttet til din identitet.
Du får se et fikseringspunkt på skjermen. Se på punktet.
Et ord i STORE BOKSTAVER kommer opp på skjermen.
Din oppgave er å avgjøre om ordene i STORE BOKSTAVER er ekte ord/merkenavn.
Hvis du kjenner et ord eller et merkenavn, trykk på den grønne knappen.
Hvis du ikke kjenner ordet eller merkenavnet, trykk på den røde knappen.
Prøv å avgjøre så fort du klarer.
Hold hendene klare på tastene.
Trykk på en knapp for å begynne testen.
Lykke til!
Translation:
All participation is voluntarily and you can leave the room at any time.
The tests are anonymous and not data connected to your identity will be stored.
You will see a fixation mark on the screen. Please look at the mark.
A word in CAPITAL letters will appear on the screen.
Your task is to decide whether the words in CAPITAL letters are real words/brand names.
If you recognize a word or brand name, press the green button.
If you don’t recognize a word or brand name, press the green button.
Try to decide as quick as possible.
Hold your hands ready at the buttons.
Press a button to start the test.
Good luck!
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Appendix 4: Results per participant
-53-
Figure 12: Reaction times per subject by stimulus type in the primed version
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Figure 13: Reaction times per subject by stimulus type in the unprimed version
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